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ABSTRACT 
Sustainability and environmental justice, two fields that developed parallel to each other, 
are both insufficient to deal with the challenges posed by institutional environmental violence 
(IEV). This thesis examines the discursive history of sustainability and critiques its focus on 
science-based technical solutions to large-scale global problems. It further analyzes the gaps in 
sustainability discourse that can be filled by environmental justice, such as the challenges posed 
by environmental racism. Despite this, neither field is able to contend with IEV in a meaningful 
way, which this thesis argues using the case study of the Flint Water Crisis (FWC). The FWC has 
been addressed as both an issue of sustainability and of environmental justice, yet IEV persists in 
the community. This is due in part to the narrative of crisis reflected by the FWC and the role 
that knowledge production plays in that narrative. To fill the gap left by both sustainability and 
environmental justice, this thesis emphasizes the need for a transformational methodology 
incorporating knowledge produced by communities and individuals directly impacted by 
sustainability problems.  
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INTRODUCTION  
“I’m not so sure Flint is the community we want to go out on a limb for. At least 
without a better understanding of where all that money went.” – Debbie Baltazar, 
chief of EPA Region 5 Water Division’s State and Tribal Programs  
As the professional and academic fields of sustainability grow more visible and 
influential through institutional and corporate integration, their emphasis on large-scale 
global problems and the science-based technical solutions they develop to solve them 
raises the risks that they are becoming increasingly exclusionary of already marginalized 
populations through. In doing so, the practical and ideological gap between sustainability 
and environmental justice widens. This is significant because such a gap may cause 
sustainability concepts and practices to overlook and/or perpetuate some of the very 
problems they seek to address. Of particular concern, large-scale global problems cannot 
be abstracted from local issues of institutional environmental violence (IEV) which 
frequently underlie the emergence of un-sustainability. I argue herein that the grassroots, 
systemic approach to institutional environmental violence, grounded in environmental 
justice, centers as a requisite element in sustainability, and that in bridging this gap using 
a transformative lens, we can begin to address the immediate and long-term harms caused 
by IEV.  
As the field of sustainability becomes more mainstream, it is at risk of losing sight 
of the notion that an embodied reality of transformative justice is critical to addressing 
the large-scale global problems that sustainability tries to address. Science-based 
solutions, for example, cannot be imagined as totally independent of existing systems of 
social power, knowledge and justice.  To pretend otherwise is to concede to 
institutionalized social injustices that could be at the root of sustainability problems to 
begin with. Perhaps nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of the Flint Water 
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Crisis, a public health and institutional violence emergency ghost-written by 
sustainability problems such as polluted water, infrastructural instability, and weak 
environmental regulations. Neither sustainability nor environmental justice are equipped 
with the discourse or praxis to address the harm caused by IEV in Flint. Compounding 
this is the aforementioned emphasis on global problems and science-based technical 
solutions, which implies the use of certain forms of knowledge production that fit within 
the rigid standards enforced by positivist science. If academic training in sustainability 
reinforces this bias, then the field may become more rigid, narrower, more scientistic, and 
more corporate. By looking at the case of Flint, it is clear that the optics of sustainability 
were and are, ironically, too narrow to “see” the problem in its multiple dimensions and 
its language tends to be too restrictive to call for or design solutions to implement radical 
transformative change.  
If this is true at a local scale, like in Flint, there is no way that sustainability will 
be able to meaningfully address the wicked, global-scale problems like climate change. 
Herein, I contend that in addition to glaring ethical concerns, environmental justice—and 
indeed evolving principles of justice generally—must be incorporated into the field of 
sustainability if we have any hope of meaningfully addressing both local and large-scale 
global problems. Furthermore, this must include a lens of institutional transformation that 
builds off of existing transformational justice literature and indeed social justice 
movements themselves. In order to illustrate this, I will first introduce and define the 
concept of IEV.  
UNSUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENCE 
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Environmental injustice and unsustainability are constitutive of violence. What 
this means is that environmental injustice and unsustainability as physical conditions are 
directly responsible for the physical, mental, and emotional harm experienced by people 
and communities impacted by them. Solnit (2014) illustrates this through the example of 
top-down and bottom-up violence attributed to climate change, arguing that climate 
violence is used almost exclusively to refer to bottom-up violence committed by 
individuals and communities affected by climate change. This is a more traditional kind 
of violence inflicted “by hands, by knife, by club, or maybe modern hands-on violence, 
by gun or by car” (Rebecca Solnit, 2014). However, this is not the only kind of violence 
experienced by communities affected by environmental degradation. Solnit (2014) 
asserts:  
If you're tremendously wealthy, you can practice industrial-scale violence without 
any manual labor on your own part. You can, say, build a sweatshop factory that 
will collapse in Bangladesh and kill more people than any hands-on mass 
murderer ever did, or you can calculate risk and benefit about putting poisons or 
unsafe machines into the world, as manufacturers do every day. (Rebecca Solnit, 
2014) 
This top-down form of violence, what I call institutional environmental violence (IEV), 
refers to the direct physical, mental, and emotional harm to members of a community 
caused by built or natural environmental degradation or lack of access to built or natural 
environmental services. These are directly or indirectly caused by institutional actions, 
policies, or decisions that enable industrial-scale violence to occur. In this context, the 
term “institution” refers to state structures such as the federal, state, and local 
government, academic organizations such as schools, and social/economic structures such 
as capitalism. The Flint water crisis (FWC) is an ongoing act of IEV.  
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 Alone, neither the current practices associated with sustainability solutions nor 
environmental justice can sufficiently address IEV—sustainability for its narrow focus 
and environmental justice for its lack of institutional power. What we need is to center the 
knowledge of people directly impacted by IEV in order to address the direct harms while 
likewise tackling the institutional factors that cause and contribute to IEV (Agyeman, 
2008; Agyeman, Bullard, & Evans, 2002; Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Bullard, 1993; 
GenerationFIVE, 2017; Kershnar et al., 2007). In this thesis, I evaluate the case of lead 
poisoning through the water supply of Flint, Michigan, as a cautionary tale that calls for a 
centering of knowledge production not typically valued by fields like sustainability. I do 
this by (1) examining the discursive histories and limitations of sustainability and 
environmental justice; (2) retelling the narrative of violence in the FWC; and (3) 
analyzing the role of knowledge production in sustainability broadly and the FWC 
specifically.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LIMITS OF SUSTAINABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE 
In this chapter, I briefly outline the discursive histories of sustainability and 
environmental justice. I then go on to highlight the role that racism plays in instances of 
environmental injustice, asserting that race in the United States is the master category of 
oppression in instances of IEV. In this brief history, it is apparent that the fields of 
sustainability and environmental justice are not incompatible, but they do face significant 
challenges in communicating with each other. This is due, in part, to the colorblind 
approach that sustainability tends to take in both theory and praxis as well as the way that 
sustainability defines problems. In defining problems, sustainability tends to rely on top-
down, power-over framing techniques that reinforce existing hegemonic structures and 
limit the discursive scope of sustainability. I conclude this chapter by asserting that if the 
field of sustainability wishes to address the so-called “wicked” problems (or problems 
that are unduly difficult to address) posed by unsustainability, it must center the theories 
of environmental justice.  
SUSTAINABILITY 
Sustainability as an academic and professional field has seen unprecedented 
growth since the turn of the 21st century (Clark & Dickson, 2003; Hart & Bell, 2013; 
Kates, Clark, Corell, Hall, & Jaeger, 2001; Komiyama & Takeuchi, 2006; Miller et al., 
2014a; Yarime, Takeda, & Kajikawa, 2010). This is clear in the widely publicized 
adoption of sustainable policies and practices by major corporations as well as the large-
scale funding of institutions teaching sustainability by private donors like the Walton 
family or the Koch brothers, multi-billion-dollar companies infamous for their global-
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scale pollution and depletion of natural resources. Despite the steadfast refusal to 
acknowledge sustainability threats (like climate change) by the U.S. government, 
sustainability has risen to center stage and remains at the forefront of American collective 
consciousness. In this collective consciousness, sustainability is intrinsically linked with 
climate change, a large-scale problem for current and future generations that threatens the 
Earth and its inhabitants writ large. This idea of inter- and intra-generational justice as 
well as the emphasis on large-scale, global problems is central to the discourse of 
sustainability (Agyeman, 2005; Dobson, 1999; World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). Because of the sheer magnitude of the problems tackled by 
sustainability, the field employs a largely top-down global or national lens, looking to 
“international processes and committees, government structures, think-tanks and 
international [non-governmental organization (NGO)] networks” (Agyeman et al., 2002, 
p. 88). Environmental justice, on the other hand, is typically understood as a grassroots or 
bottom-up response composed of expert-defined “stakeholders” with interests in major 
top-down decisions like siting or policy (Agyeman et al., 2002, p. 88).    
Sustainability is historically thought to have grown out of the 1987 Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, commonly 
referred to as the Brundtland Report, which defined sustainable development as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). More recently, the field of sustainability science has grown in an 
attempt to convey the urgency of the problems illustrated in the Brundtland Report and 
develop systematic, evidence-based, effective solutions based on the scientific evidence  
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(Tarlock, 2002). The development of sustainability science as a field worthy of pursuit 
and study was largely cemented by Kates et al. (2001), wherein they argue the need for 
an understanding of the “fundamental character of interactions between nature and 
society” (Kates et al., 2001, p. 641). Kates et al. further assert that “such an 
understanding must encompass the interaction of global processes with the ecological and 
social characteristics of particular places and sectors,” situating the field as necessarily 
inter- and trans-disciplinary (Kates et al., 2001, p. 641). Integral to the development of 
sustainability science was the focus on tangible solutions to sustainability problems, 
which necessitated the inclusion of and focus on “different ways of knowing and 
learning” that sought to enhance the scientific process through the inclusion of a variety 
of voices and disciplines (Kates et al., 2001, p. 641). In particular, Kates et al. contend 
that “in a world put at risk by the unintended consequences of scientific progress, 
participatory procedures involving scientists, stakeholders, advocates, active citizens, and 
users of knowledge are critically needed” (Kates et al., 2001, p. 641).  
This emphasis on integration and social participation in scientific problem-solving 
has been echoed by sustainability scientists like Yarime et al. (2012), who argue that the 
complexity of sustainability problems demands the integration of “knowledge and 
information from various academic disciplines, including natural sciences, engineering, 
social sciences, and humanities” (Yarime et al., 2012, p. 102). Wiek et al. (2012) similarly 
contend that it is necessary for scientists to “engage with a broad range of stakeholders 
from other domains of society, not only to improve the collective understanding of 
coupled systems […] but also to develop joint and coordinated strategies for how to solve 
sustainability problems” (Wiek, Farioli, Fukushi, & Yarime, 2012, p. 6). The significance 
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of practical application of solutions is central to the field of sustainability science, coming 
out of an understanding that sustainability problems are inherently urgent and therefore 
work done in the field must precipitate or involve the application of a tangible solution. 
Consequently, sustainability science is innovative and radical in the world of academia 
(Benessia et al., 2012; Carlson, 2017; Miller et al., 2014b; Yarime et al., 2012). That said, 
the field grew out of academic spaces—specifically, the field of sustainable development, 
which cultivated a largely positivist scientific tradition that regards the scientific process 
as a producer of objective truths not influenced by bias (Kates et al., 2001, p. 641). 
Sustainable development specifically (through large-scale neocolonial projects like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Carrasco, 2002; Durokifa & Ijeoma, 
2018; Käkönen, 1975; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2010)) and academia broadly are reliant on 
hegemonic structures of Western colonial white supremacy and cisheteropatriarchy that 
define Western culture writ large through the ongoing structure of settler colonialism 
(Dei, 2016; Fanon, 1963; Glenn, 2015). These hegemonic structures value certain—
white, cisgender (a person whose gender identity matches the gender they were assigned 
at birth), male—bodies and types of knowledge typically produced by those bodies over 
marginalized groups and individuals. These structures, overwhelmingly present in 
sustainable development projects of large-scale development banks, are likewise present 
in sustainability science (Carrasco, 2002; Durokifa & Ijeoma, 2018; Käkönen, 1975; 
Mawuko-Yevugah, 2010). For the purposes of this paper, both sustainability science and 
sustainable development will be referred to as simply sustainability. I also feel the need 
to specify that when discussing sustainability and environmental justice, I am specifically 
discussing the narrative realities of the fields—how they appear in the collective 
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consciousness of people outside of the fields. This is significant because there are a 
number of significant contributors to both fields that are actively addressing the critiques 
I raise in this thesis (Agyeman et al., 2002; Agyeman & Evans, 2003; Alkon & Agyeman, 
2011; Braz & Gilmore, 2006; Bullard, 1993; Checker, 2011; Gonzalez, 2015; Haas et al., 
2018; Mares & Peña, 2011).  
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM 
Environmental justice in the United States has historically focused largely on the 
distribution of risk of environmental harm (Schlosberg, 2013). Furthermore, “the roots of 
contemporary environmental injustice lie in colonialism,” which means that the 
distribution of risk largely impacts already marginalized communities (Gonzalez, 2015, p. 
159). Despite this, a more mainstream conception of environmental justice centers the 
role of white mothers in a standard narrative. This is perhaps most clear in the case of 
Love Canal, wherein  
Hooker Chemical dumped large amounts of some very nasty stuff in a hole in 
Niagara Falls, New York, and then covered it up—literally and figuratively—
before selling the property to the local school board for $1. In the 1970s, large 
amounts of rainfall caused some of the buried waste to leak out of its containers, 
flow to the surface, and contaminate homes in the area. (Blum, 2008, p. 1) 
Upon discovering this toxic history, residents of Love Canal realized that the poor health 
they were experiencing was likely caused by this contamination. Lois Gibbs, a white 
mother and homeowner, spearheaded the effort “to get the entire neighborhood relocated” 
(Blum, 2008, p. 1). She had little help from the government, who refused to act without 
absolute scientific proof of causation:  
The relevant governmental body, the New York State Department of Health, failed 
to find any relationship between proximity to Love Canal and higher incidence of 
disease, implying, accordingly, that there was no evidence of a negative health 
effect from the canal. In response, residents conducted health surveys indicating 
the incidents of cancer and other diseases in the community. With the help of 
 10 
Beverly Paigen, a professional cancer researcher, local activists overlaid their 
results onto a map. (Edelstein, 2000, p. 126) 
The case of Love Canal is critical to understanding environmental justice in a number of 
ways—in particular, it highlights the structural racism that shapes American government 
and society. While the popular narrative of Love Canal focused on a white mother, Lois 
Gibbs, the truth was that “gender, race, and class played a vital role in how the residents 
of Love Canal experienced and dealt with the environmental crisis” (Blum, 2008, p. 2). 
Furthermore, this narrative obscures the role that Black activists who played a central role 
in exposing the toxic history of the area (Blum, 2008). Racism is present in every 
instance of environmental injustice; this is not to say that the only people who experience 
environmental injustice are people of color (POC), but rather that the social construction 
of race contributes to the distribution of risk and harm. Pulido (2017) draws attention to 
this, asserting that it stems from a mis-conceptualization of the problem of environmental 
justice, “including not giving sufficient weight to the ballast of past racial violence, and 
assuming the state to be a neutral force, when, in fact, it is actively sanctioning and/or 
producing racial violence in the form of death and degraded bodies and environments” 
(Pulido, 2017, pp. 524–525). 
Omi & Winant (2015) regard race as the “master category of oppression and 
resistance in the United States,” meaning that “in the United States race has served as a 
template for both difference and inequality” (Omi & Winant, 2015, p. 245). In the context 
of environmental justice this means that race is always a factor, which necessitates the 
application of an anti-racist lens. It is important here to recognize the great human 
sacrifice that “created the United States and all the Americas: the twin genocides of 
conquest and slavery,” as this history shapes our society and our spatial reality to this day 
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(Omi & Winant, 2015, p. 245). This is clear in the distribution of risk and harm, which 
disproportionately impacts communities of color. This assertion has since been backed up 
by countless scholars and activists who argue that environmental justice cannot be 
separated from race; while environmental injustice impacts individuals and communities 
across lines drawn by race, class, and gender, race persists as the master category of 
oppression in instances of environmental injustice (Blum, 2008; Bullard, 1993; Ford & 
Airhihenbuwa, 2010; Macias, 2016; Massey, 2004; Roby, 2016; Schulz et al., 2016) 
In recognizing this, I turn to the disproportionate burden of environmental racism 
that is placed on Black Americans, which is compounded by a lack of access to “social, 
economic, and political resources with which to mitigate the adverse health effects of” 
environmental hazards (Schulz et al., 2016, p. 287). Schulz et al. (2016) reference the 
Detroit metropolitan area in particular, contending that environmental hazards and 
associated health risks “disproportionately affect the health of communities of color, 
those with heightened economic vulnerability, and those with heightened age-related 
susceptibility” (Schulz et al., 2016, p. 299). While it is easy to attribute this increased risk 
to class and income disparities related to physical geography, it is likewise important to 
recognize the role that race plays in these issues, particularly when looking for ways to 
“solve” them: 
While both class and race determine the distribution of environmental hazards, 
racial minorities are more likely to be exposed to environmental threats than are 
whites of the same social class. Race is a powerful predictor of many 
environmental hazards, including the distribution of air pollution, the location of 
municipal solid waste facilities, the location of abandoned toxic waste sites, toxic 
fish consumption, and lead poisoning in children. (Bullard, 1993, pp. 319–320) 
Environmental racism thus becomes a critical lens in understanding IEV in particular 
communities and how justice is (not) addressed, serving as an extension of the existing 
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state of racism and inequality that shapes the reality of the United States settler colony 
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014; Fanon, 1963; Omi & Winant, 2015).   
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF “JUST” SUSTAINABILITY 
Sustainability and environmental justice are not incompatible, but the synergies 
between them remain insufficiently acknowledged and developed. The two discourses 
have largely “developed in parallel and, although they have touched, there has been 
insufficient interpenetration of values, framings, ideas and understandings” (Agyeman et 
al., 2002, p. 88). 
This is clear in the discursive divide between the two disciplines, wherein scholars from 
both fields tend to argue that the other is too limiting. In discussing sustainable 
development, Salkin et al. (2012) contend:  
Because sustainable development is a form of development, it automatically 
includes the entire sphere of economic and social development, raising basic 
questions about acceptable forms of economic development anywhere. While 
many environmental justice issues are framed in terms of impacts of a particular 
project or activity […], sustainable development raises basis systemic questions. 
(Dernbach, Salkin, & Brown, 2012, p. 18) 
On the other hand, Agyeman (2008) asserts that in terms of the United States, “the 
environmental sustainability movement does not have an analysis or theory of change 
with strategies for dealing with […] issues” of justice and equity, leaving it unable to 
transform the systems it claims to critique like the state (Agyeman, 2008, p. 751). 
Agyeman (2008) attributes this, in part, to the growing acceptance of sustainability by 
corporate and government structures—the very institutions that both discourses argue 
must be radically transformed in order to secure a sustainable/just future—and the 
stratification of privilege between the two discourses. Agyeman (2008) asserts, “there is 
abundant research that characterizes the environmental sustainability movement as 
 13 
largely white, educated and middle class while the environmental justice movement is 
largely low-income, people of colour driven” (Agyeman, 2008, pp. 752–753). Pulido 
(2017) asserts that this must be combatted by rethinking the state as “a site of opposition” 
that is antithetical to the goals of environmental justice (Pulido, 2017, p. 525). 
Furthermore, while there is a large body of literature lobbying for the inclusion of 
environmental justice—or, at the bare minimum, justice—in sustainability discourse and 
strategy from the environmental justice side, there is very little recognition as yet from 
the sustainability side about the value of including justice. The exception to this might be 
sustainable development, a field steeped in such controversy as to virtually require the 
integration of social justice praxis (Alkon & Agyeman, 2011; Farley, 2013; Kauffman, 
2009).  
In many ways, sustainability as a field is colorblind, subscribing to the hegemonic 
discourse that in their quest to “save the world,” “they are saving it for everyone equally, 
which somehow absolves them from wider discussions of equity and justice” (Agyeman, 
2008, p. 751). Colorblindness, a form of racism, ignores the role that race plays in 
instances of structural violence and discrimination, instead “placing blame for the 
conditions of inequity on those who have been the targets of systemic injustice” (Wise, 
2010, p. 19). Colorblind approaches to sustainability might include financial incentives to 
reduce gasoline use, such as a gas tax applied equally to everyone, that would reduce the 
output of greenhouse gasses but place the burden on those who can least afford it. While 
race is not overtly present in any of these approaches, the long history of Black exclusion 
from wealth accumulation means that they would all place a disproportionate burden on 
Black and non-Black communities of color (Feagin, 1999; Ferguson, 2004; Ford & 
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Airhihenbuwa, 2010; Gallagher, 2003; Lipsitz, 2009). Furthermore, the root causes of 
sustainability problems are likely to be misidentified if approached through a lens of 
colorblindness. Without examining the historical contexts and traumas that shape the 
sustainability problem, any solution is necessarily going to strengthen structures of 
inequity—structures that are antithetical to the goals of sustainability.  
In their seminal essay decrying the Death of Environmentalism, Nordhaus & 
Shellenberger (2005) lambast the environmental sustainability movement for its 
weakness on social justice and narrow vision of technocratic solutions-based thinking:  
Nearly all of the more than two-dozen environmentalists we interviewed 
underscored that climate change demands that we remake the global economy in 
ways that will transform the lives of six billion people. All recognize that it’s an 
undertaking of monumental size and complexity. And all acknowledged that we 
must reduce emissions by up to 70 percent as soon as possible. But in their public 
campaigns, not one of America’s environmental leaders is articulating a vision of 
the future commensurate with the magnitude of the crisis. Instead they are 
promoting technical policy fixes like pollution controls and higher vehicle 
mileage standards — proposals that provide neither the popular inspiration nor the 
political alliances the community needs to deal with the problem. (Nordhaus & 
Shellenberger, 2005) 
Part of this, they argue, comes from the way that environmental sustainability defines 
problems:  
Why, for instance, is a human-made phenomenon like global warming — which 
may kill hundreds of millions of human beings over the next century — 
considered ‘environmental’? Why are poverty and war not considered 
environmental problems while global warming is? What are the implications of 
framing global warming as an environmental problem — and handing off the 
responsibility for dealing with it to ‘environmentalists’? (Nordhaus & 
Shellenberger, 2005) 
Taking this critique even further, I contend that the problem lies not only in how a 
problem is defined, but also who is defining it. Traditionally, problems are defined by 
“experts” within traditional academic models such as scientists or researchers. This is 
significant in that “the way a problem is framed determines the possible policies that can 
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be crafted to offer a solution” as well as the direction that research takes, which 
necessitates funding (Ascher, 2007, p. 144; Farley, 2013, p. 8). Likewise, when problems 
are defined by experts identified by academia rather than experts identified by impacted 
individuals and communities, those definitions thus “imply a set of underlying 
assumptions that confine or constrain our ability to raise questions and think about 
possible alternatives” (Roby, 2016, p. 4).  
Howieson et al. (2019) argue that this sort of problem framing draws on 
traditional policy discourse that relies on a “neoliberal leadership paradigm” that operates 
using “power-over” (Howieson, Burnes, & Summers, 2019). This is clear in the field of 
sustainable development, wherein sustainability is defined by powerful financial and 
political organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and World Bank (WB). Therefore, “the way sustainable development is discussed 
also frames the problems sustainable development is meant to address which limits the 
possible policy alternatives that might be used” (Farley, 2013, p. 8). Sustainability 
science is likewise exclusionary in that in order to be considered a problem, “a situation 
needs to get recognized and judged to be averse, in terms of sustainability, on justifiable 
grounds, and by a group of legitimate stakeholders” (Wiek, 2015, p. 16). The idea of 
legitimate stakeholders here implies a certain type of knowledge found in hegemonic 
structures of positivist science. Sustainability prides itself on pragmatism and innovation, 
yet its reliance on traditional definitions of problems combined with its increasing 
integration with institutional and corporate interests keeps it firmly rooted hegemonic 
Western structures of knowledge and action. In practice, this strengthens Howieson et 
al.’s (2019) neoliberal leadership paradigm, a paradigm  
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that prioritises the pursuit of profit through free markets, private enterprise, 
deregulation and a reduction in state power, taxation and expenditure. Its rationale 
is that society works best when people, organisations and governments operate on 
a free market basis, and leaders are motivated by the pursuit of profit, which is 
seen not only as a common good but as the prime and possibly the only common 
good. (Howieson et al., 2019, p. 1) 
Sustainable problems cannot be meaningfully addressed under this type of hegemonic 
leadership, as the type of radical transformational change that is required does not—and 
cannot—conform to the values espoused by the neoliberal free market.  
 The problems that sustainability and environmental justice are trying to address 
are what Batie (2008) refers to as “wicked problems,” which tend to be “dynamically 
complex, ill-structured, public problems” (Batie, 2008, p. 1176). The wickedness of these 
problems  
Stems not only from their biophysical complexity but also from multiple 
stakeholders’ perceptions of them and of potential trade-offs associated with 
problem solving. Identification of solutions becomes as much a social and 
political problem as it is a scientific endeavor. (Batie, 2008, p. 1176) 
Batie (2008) goes on to assert that wicked problems cannot be addressed without 
“meaningful engagement of stakeholders in decision making that propels knowledge into 
action” (Batie, 2008, p. 1181). While the term “stakeholders” is too derivative to apply to 
individuals impacted by IEV, the idea of meaningful collaboration that underpins Batie’s 
(2008) assertion stands. In terms of the wicked problems of unsustainability and 
environmental injustice, it follows that they  
cannot be solved without inclusion, stakeholder participation, and the serious 
involvement of non-experts in defining problems and developing solution options. To 
seriously embrace a commitment to inclusion requires admitting that solutions may 
sometimes require a radical transformative justice approach that calls into question the 
very institutions that brought about those problems. While there is an abundance of 
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sustainability literature that espouses the importance of transformative approaches, they 
lack the focus of justice, leaving them unable to comprehensively address IEV (Wamsler 
et al., 2018; Wiek, Ness, Schweizer-Ries, Brand, & Farioli, 2012; Wiek, Withycombe, & 
Redman, 2011). In many ways, environmental justice already employs many of the 
transformative justice tools needed to combat IEV. In this thesis, I contend that if 
sustainability truly wants to address climate change and other major environmental 
problems, environmental justice must be given a central voice in sustainability discourse 
using a lens of institutional transformation.  
In this chapter, I provided a brief overview of the discursive histories of 
sustainability and environmental justice. Following this, I highlighted the colorblind 
approach that sustainability tends to take and asserted that this exacerbates existing 
environmental racism, a concern that arises from the lack of discursive communication 
between the two fields. In the following chapter, I will examine the role of IEV in the 
case of the FWC, asserting that neither sustainability nor environmental justice alone 
were or are sufficient in addressing the immediate and long-term harm caused by the 
FWC. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: A CASE STUDY IN IEV 
In this chapter, I retell the story of the FWC in a chronological narrative, focusing 
first on the popular narrative as told by government officials and media outlets at the time 
of the crisis. This narrative is critical to the understanding of environmental justice 
discourse because of its similar structure to other instances of environmental injustice and 
IEV. In April 2013, the City of Flint, under the direction of an Emergency Manager (EM) 
appointed by Governor Rick Snyder, joined the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), 
which would bring water from Lake Huron to Flint and be processed through the Flint 
Water Treatment Plant (WTP) before distribution to the city’s nearly 100,000 residents. 
This decision, which has since been widely critiqued by local organizations such as Flint 
Rising, was made ostensibly to save the City and its residents money and was largely 
seen as a response to the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department’s (DWSD) consistent 
rate increases (Hanna-Attisha, 2017; Moore, 2018). In the interim, Flint had planned to 
continue purchasing water from the DWSD, the city’s water supply since 1967, but 
elected to use treated Flint River water instead after negotiations with DWSD broke 
down in late 2013. In April 2014, Mayor Dayne Walling pushed a button in the WTP that 
switched the water source from DWSD to the Flint River and subsequently ignited one of 
the worst environmental crises in the nation’s history.  
Almost immediately following the initial switch, residents began alerting local 
authorities of their concerns with the water quality, citing brown water, odd smells, and a 
variety of health concerns including skin inflammation and rashes in children (Zahran, 
McElmurry, & Sadler, 2017, p. 160). This is where the common narrative of the FWC 
starts to center on one resident’s concerns in particular—those of LeeAnne Walters, a 
 19 
white mother of three young boys. On January 21, a now-famous photo of Walters was 
taken as she held up bottles of brown water from her tap in from of EM Jerry Ambrose 
(Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016, p. 92):  
 
Figure 1. LeeAnne Walters showing water samples to EM Jerry Ambrose on January 21, 
2015  
Shortly after this confrontation, Walters called the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and subsequently the Department of Public Works (DPW) in to test her 
water, and “WOW!!! Did [they] find LEAD! 104 parts per billion” (ppb), nearly 10 times 
the federal action level of 15 ppb (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016, p. 93).  
Despite the high lead level at Walter’s residence, the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality (MDEQ) maintained that the water was safe to drink, blaming 
Walters’ high lead level on lead plumbing inside her home (all of which was, in fact, 
PVC) and claiming that it was an outlier and did not impact the city’s compliance with 
the national Lead and Copper Rule (LCR). On April 27, 2015 Miguel Del Toral from the 
EPA visited Walters’ home to investigate the high lead levels and gave Walters the contact 
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information for Professor Marc Edwards, who worked to prove that lead was present in 
Washington D.C.’s municipal water system. Two key things came out of this meeting: (1) 
Miguel Del Toral’s Draft Memo and (2) the Flint Water Study (FWS). On June 24, Del 
Toral sent his “Interim Report: High Lead Levels in Flint, Michigan” to his supervisor at 
the EPA, outlining a number of concerns regarding lead in Flint’s water including the 
lack of corrosion control treatment at the WTP (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016, p. 
97). This report takes on the air of civil disobedience in the common narrative today—a 
“rogue employee” coming out to tell the residents of Flint that there was lead in the water 
while the rest of the EPA remained silent—particularly after he shared the memo with 
LeeAnne Walters, who leaked the memo to the press (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 
2016, pp. 97, 103). In reality, Del Toral may not have known that Walters’ would share 
the memo with the press, and his decision to share his findings with a directly impacted 
party were not unusual for EPA employees.  
Around the same time, Dr. Edwards established the FWS with a team of graduate 
students from Virginia Tech. The FWS took samples from homes in Flint using a 
procedure that notably differed from what the MDEQ was using and sent them back to 
the Virginia Tech lab for analysis. Significantly, the FWS published all of their results 
online and called residents to inform them of their home’s lead levels, which brought a 
great deal of local attention to the high lead levels being found (Edwards, Roy, Rhoads, 
Parks, & Mantha, 2015). At this point, no action had been taken to mitigate the problem 
of lead leaching into Flint water by the state, county, or local governments, although quite 
a lot of action had been taken to cover it up, including allegedly changing blood lead data 
to reflect lower lead levels (Fonger, 2018; Moore, 2018). The community was justifiably 
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enraged by the time Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a pediatrician in Flint, released her study 
on blood lead levels (BLL) in children before and after the water switch on April 24, 
2014. Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s data showed a correlation between the switch and high BLLs, 
which she announced at a press conference immediately after tests were completed, 
bypassing the peer-review process in favor of disseminating the information, arguing that 
the situation was too urgent to wait for peer review (Hanna-Attisha, 2017). After several 
days of trying to discredit Dr. Hanna-Attisha and poke holes in her data and methods, the 
city finally issued a public health advisory admitting that there was lead in Flint drinking 
water. A month later, Governor Rick Snyder and President Barack Obama declared States 
of Emergency just days apart.  
In terms of the common narrative, this is where the story ends. The city switched 
back to DWSD water, elected a new mayor, and went on with their lives. The residents of 
Flint were saved by scientists, doctors, and a single vocal resident speaking out against a 
corrupt government. The FWC has not “ended,” nor has it been solved; in the following 
sections, I will outline parts of this story that have been left out—sometimes 
intentionally—and offer analysis of the FWC as an ongoing instance of IEV before 
detailing the significance of the FWC in sustainability and environmental justice 
discourse, and how it might serve as a test case for a hybrid concept of just sustainability.  
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENCE IN FLINT 
 The people of Flint have been poisoned by their government. In a scathing 
Facebook post, Flint Councilmember Wantwaz Davis (a mayoral candidate at the time) 
wrote:  
It has become apparent to me that the emergency manager and Governor Rick 
Snyder is creating an obvious genocide against the residents in Flint, Michigan, 
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who are forced to drink the contaminated, unhealthy water, that is going to 
commit an imminent danger to the lives of those who have a compromised 
immune system, and infants who biologically doesn't have a fully developed 
immune system. […] This is a picture of [sic] reminder that in the past summer, I 
conducted 4 protest against the contaminated water and high water bills, I was 
telling people about the unhealthy water, before any notices came out to the 
public, attempting to keep these issues at the forefront, as mayor I will continue to 
fight even harder, these issues will not die until justice is brought to the people 
and someone is charged for this imminent genocide. (R. Fonger, personal 
correspondence, April 6, 2015) 
Activists in Flint tend to refer to the FWC in much the same way—as an act of violence; 
in particular, an act of violence against Black Americans:  
@BlckGirlsMatter 
#TamirRice's murder and the deadly effects of the #Flint #lead water are ALL 
connected as gratuitous violence against Black communities 
5:08 PM – 18 Jan 2016 (BlckGirlsMatter, 2016) 
In a study on youth perception of critical race theory in the FWC, a number of young 
residents likewise echoed this sentiment:  
Speaker 66 [forum 4.2, male, Black, 16, grade 11]: I think that’s [the official 
narrative] all a lie. I think it’s genocide. (Muhammad et al., 2018, p. 244) 
 
Speaker 68 [forum 4.2, male, multi-racial, 15, grade 9]: I believe like the water 
got something to do with the killings too. They’re not doing nothing about all the 
murders that happen… (Muhammad et al., 2018, p. 244) 
It is important to note that I am not the first one to refer to the FWC as an act of violence; 
this framing comes from those affected by the crisis; those experiencing that violence 
firsthand. It is also important to note that this framing is notably absent from the common 
narrative of the FWC, as are the many activists who protested this violence as early as 
May 2014, when residents started filing complaints with the City over water quality and 
high water prices (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). In September 2014, Flint 
resident Jerry Lynch wrote:  
I just read in The Journal that 16 million gallons of raw sewage was dumped in 
the Flint River. What I want to ask is, just how safe is our drinking water? They 
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say don’t make body contact with the water. Where does this sewage go? 
Residents on the west side of Flint had to boil water for days because of bad 
water. After all of this, the City of Flint says the water is safe to drink once the 
boil water advisory is lifted. Remember, city officials speak with forked tongues. 
The earth is covered by 71 percent water and in Flint there’s none safe to drink. 
Get real, City of Flint. Oh, and by the way, Flint residents, don’t forget to pay 
your $150-a-month bill for this great-tasting water. (Lynch, 2014) 
The bulk of the narrative of the FWC centers on lead in the water, although this 
was just one element of the violence experience in Flint because of the water switch. That 
said, lead is extremely dangerous, and the effects of lead poisoning are irreversible. In 
children, lead exposure “may result in anemia, kidney damage, colic, muscle weakness, 
and brain damage. Exposure to the fetus during pregnancy can result in fetal death, 
premature delivery, low birth weight, and lower intelligence in later childhood” (Butler, 
Scammell, & Benson, 2016, p. 93). While there are a number of very serious physical 
health concerns with lead poisoning that should not be discounted, I will focus on the 
mental health concerns. Lead exposure specifically targets a number of cognitive 
functions, including “attention and executive functions, visual-motor integration, fine and 
gross motor skills, verbal skills, and learning” (Healy & Bernstein, 2016, p. 168). 
Because of this, lead exposure has also been linked to learning disabilities, poor academic 
performance, and lower intellectual functioning (Healy & Bernstein, 2016). This can lead 
to higher rates of delinquent behavior and subsequently higher rates of interaction with 
the criminal justice system and prison industrial complex (Corburn, 2005; Denno, 1993; 
Healy & Bernstein, 2016; Needleman, McFarland, Ness, Fienberg, & Tobin, 2002; Nevin, 
2000).  
Furthermore, survivors of the FWC are also subjected to the mental health 
concerns associated with a natural or man-made disaster, such as “post-traumatic stress 
and fear, anxiety, and depression” (Healy & Bernstein, 2016, p. 167). These harms 
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experienced by the residents of Flint are the direct consequences of IEV and are largely 
distorted by the common narrative of the FWC. What this means is that the persistent 
harms of lead poisoning and governmental neglect as well as the underlying conditions 
informed by (environmental) racism persist within the City.  Before discussing the 
significance of this common narrative in these persistent harms, however, it is critical to 
understand the role that sustainability and environmental justice played and are playing in 
the FWC.  
SUSTAINABILITY IN FLINT  
 The FWC was informed by a number of problems central to sustainability, as 
defined by Brundtland and prevailing definitions thereafter, such as water pollution, 
infrastructural instability, and weak environmental regulations. When the City of Flint 
initially switched water sources from DWSD to the Flint River, there was pushback from 
residents and city employees because of the long history of pollution of the river 
stemming back to the 1930s,  
when the area’s booming auto industry manufactured batteries, paints, lacquers, 
enamels, and gasoline, releasing the by-products of these processes into the city’s 
air, water, and soil. The Flint River carried the toxic effluent of a city that was at 
one time an industrial mecca and economic powerhouse. (Butler et al., 2016, p. 
94) 
While the river had been purportedly cleaned up pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), residents remained wary due to the continued use of the river as a dump site for 
manufacturers like General Motors (GM) (Highsmith, 2009). Furthermore, while the 
city’s own internal reports claimed that the water could safely be used as the primary 
source of drinking water, some city officials spoke out publicly against the decision, 
citing pressure from above to make the switch regardless of the safety of the water:   
From: Michael Glasgow 
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Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2014 11:05 AM 
Subject: Re: Proposed Water Monitoring - City of Flint 
 
[…] I have people above me making plans to distribute water ASAP. I was 
reluctant before, but after looking at the monitoring schedule and our current 
staffing, I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime 
soon. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple weeks, it will be 
against my direction. I need time to adequately train additional staff and to update 
our monitoring plans before I will feel we are ready. I will reiterate this to 
management above me, but they seem to have their own agenda. (M. Glasgow, 
personal correspondence, April 17, 2014)  
Because of the long history of pollution, the primary concern was whether the water 
would meet SDWA regulations or not. To achieve this, the WTP referenced a 2011 report 
commissioned by the city which notes that river water will require more treatment than 
DWSD water and recommends a number of precautions to take including capital 
improvements to the WTP and the addition of phosphate as a corrosion control (ROWE 
& Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, 2011). While there were steps taken to ensure clean 
drinking water, these recommendations were largely dismissed—particularly the 
recommendation that the City add a corrosion control like phosphate to the river water, 
which was required by federal regulation. When asked about the use of corrosion control, 
responses ranged from affirming that Flint was using optimized corrosion control to 
admitting that it was not using any corrosion control:  
From: Busch, Stephen (DEQ) 
Sent: Friday, February 27, 2015 1:48 PM 
To: Crooks, Jennifer; Deltoral, Miguel 
Cc: Rosenthal, Adam (DEQ); Poy, Thomas; Porter, Andrea; Prysby, Mike (DEQ); 
Benzie, Richard (DEQ); Shekter Smith, Liane (DEQ) 
Subject: RE: HIGH LEAD: FLINT Water testing results  
 
The City of Flint […] has an Optimized Corrosion Control Program (S. Busch, 
personal correspondence, February 27, 2015) 
 
From: Prysby, Mike (DEQ) 
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 20:32 AM 
To: Cook, Pat (DEQ) 
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Cc: Busch, Stephen (DEQ); Rosenthal, Adam (DEQ) 
Subject: RE: Flint Corrosion Control  
 
As we discussed, Flint is not practicing corrosion control treatment at the WTP. 
(M. Prysby, personal correspondence, April 24, 2015) 
In terms of water quality, the Flint River water encountered three major problems 
throughout the FWC, only one of which was portrayed in the common narrative of the 
crisis: (1) Legionella; (2) trihalomethanes (TTHM); and (3) lead and other heavy metal 
pollutants.  
 Legionella, which causes Legionnaire’s disease, spread through the water because 
of insufficient water treatment at the plant (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). 
While the MDEQ initially shirked responsibility for one of the largest Legionnaires 
outbreak in the past decade, which killed 12 people between 2014 and 2016, it has since 
been attributed to the water switch:  
From: Wurfel, Brad (DEQ) 
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2015 10:14 AM 
 To: Murray, David (GOV) 
Subject: RE: When you have a few minutes today 
 
[…] I don't want my director to say publicly that the water in Flint is safe until we 
get the results of some county health department epidemiological traceback work 
on 47 cases of Legionnaires disease in Genesee County since last May. (B. 
Wurfel, personal correspondence, January 30, 2015) 
TTHM contamination was caused by over-treatment of the water at the plant. TTHMs are 
a byproduct of water treatment agents, and at high concentrations can act as a slow-acting 
carcinogen (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). Mandatory testing caught the high 
TTHM rates, as well as other contaminant like fecal coliform, which forced the city to 
issue notices and, in some cases, boil water advisories to inform residents and 
recommend precautions (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). TTHM contamination 
caused the water to be highly corrosive—so much so that the GM plant located in Flint 
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made a deal with the City to return to DWSD water as the river water was corroding their 
auto parts, switching back just months after the initial switch (Flint Water Advisory Task 
Force, 2016; Fonger, 2014b, 2014c). This increased corrosivity was directly responsible 
for the high lead levels found in Flint water. The lead contamination was caused by a lack 
of corrosion control in the water, which allowed the water to strip away at the vast 
network of pipes in the city, many of which contained or were made of lead, allowing that 
lead to leach into the water (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). While lead took 
center stage in the common narrative of the crisis, any one of these pollution problems 
could have (and should have) been labeled a crisis alone, particularly given the fact that 
they were (and are) all connected. This leads into the second major sustainability problem 
in flint: infrastructural instability.  
The City of Flint was rapidly built in response to demand for housing from GMs 
growing number of manufacturing employees (Highsmith, 2009). The city’s exponential 
growth spawned severe infrastructure crises, housing shortages, and public health 
calamities” (Highsmith, 2009, p. 31). As GMs profits soared, so too did the population 
and prosperity of the city—but when the Great Depression hit, GM largely abandoned 
Flint and its dependent population. In response, people with the means to do so started 
leaving Flint, taking their money and resources with them. Today, the city is home to 
about a third of its carrying capacity and relies on infrastructure that is, in some cases, as 
old as the city itself. Those who remained in Flint were (and are) largely low income; this 
combined with the fractional population means that there were limited tax revenues that 
could be used to improve infrastructure. It is also important to note that this history 
disproportionately impacted Black Americans who were systematically excluded from 
 28 
owning homes through the racist practice of redlining and tended to be the first laid off 
by GM (Highsmith, 2009). The weak, aging infrastructure in Flint was a major factor in 
the FWC, particularly in terms of lead distribution. The abundance of lead pipes 
combined with the lack of corrosion control treatment meant that lead easily leached 
from the pipes and into the drinking water of Flint residents. This could have been 
addressed through routine testing in accordance with the LCR if not for the City’s weak 
environmental regulations and weak interpretation of federal regulations.  
Routine testing caught TTHM contamination as well as other contaminants such 
as fecal coliform and allowed the city to send out boil water advisories to address water 
quality concerns with the residents. Routine testing should have caught the elevated lead 
levels, and in some ways, it did. Interpretation of the LCR allowed MDEQ officials to 
essentially control the results of LCR testing. Specifically, MDEQ pre-flushed taps prior 
to collecting samples, which Miguel Del Toral argued misrepresented the data as it led to 
lower lead level results than were likely present (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). 
While this was not standard operating procedure for the EPA or MDEQ, it did not violate 
the LCR’s testing procedure; the argument for pre-flushing was that without it, lead could 
stagnate in pipes and lead to higher water lead results than were likely to be encountered 
by consumers:  
From: Prysby, Mike (DEQ) 
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2015 10:25AM  
To: Crooks, Jennifer 
Cc: Busch, Stephen (DEQ); Rosenthal, Adam (DEQ) 
Subject: RE: HIGH LEAD: FLINT Water testing Results 
I recall Adam showing me a high lead/copper sample result (perhaps it was this 
one [Walters’ home])… as part of the city’s routine lead-copper monitoring. If so, 
it was a stagnated sample as part of the sampling protocol. […] They [the City] 
should offer to re-sample for PB after flushing the tap to demonstrate that flushing 
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the tap will reduce the lead concentration. (M. Prysby, personal correspondence, 
February 26, 2015) 
When this practice was called into question by people like Curt Guyette from the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Marc Edwards, and Miguel Del Toral, City 
officials reacted with near tangible disdain:  
From: Tommasulo, Karen (DEQ) 
Sent: Tuesday, July 07, 2015 10:29 AM 
To: Wurfel, Brad (DEQ) 
Subject: Call from ACLU reporter about Flint 
I got a weird call from a “reporter” with the ACLU asking about Flint drinking 
water. His name is Curt Guyette, and I’m 98 percent sure it’s the same guy who 
used to work at the Metro Times.  
He said he heard from someone at EPA that we use a “flawed methodology” to 
collect our water samples. We apparently tell people to flush the water from their 
pipes, let it sit overnight, and then take the sample in the morning. He claims this 
doesn’t measure what’s in the main pipes, only in the pipes leading directly to 
their house. Consequently, he claims, we vastly underestimate lead. Apparently 
the EPA and Virginia Tech sampled a house using a different methodology and 
found 13,000 ppb lead. (K. Tommasulo, personal correspondence, July 7, 2015) 
Furthermore, internal communication shows a lack of consensus within the MDEQ:  
From: Wurfel, Brad (DEQ) 
Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2015 4:54 PM 
To: Busch, Stephen (DEQ); Benzie, Richard (DEQ); Shekter Smith, Liane (DEQ) 
Cc: Pallone, Maggie (DEQ); Wyant, Dan (DEQ) 
Subject: FW: here’s the interim report  
[…] Her [Lindsey Smith, reporter] inquiry has to do with EPA’s Miguel making 
an assertion that we (DEQ) encourage people to flush their pipes before taking a 
water sample… which is the opposite of what you described to me as the 
protocol. Miguel apparently asserts that the DEQ and EPA are at odds on proper 
protocol. Which seems weird. (B. Wurfel, personal correspondence, July 9, 2015) 
Furthermore, MDEQ removed a number of sites with high lead levels from their sample 
pool using arbitrary excuses and directed employees to collect samples they knew would 
be under the federal AL: 
From: Rosenthal, Adam (DEQ)  
Sent: Thursday, June 25, 2015 10:48 AM 
To: Mike Glasgow; 'bwright@cityofflint.com' 
Cc: Prysby, Mike (DEQ); Busch, Stephen (DEQ) 
 30 
Subject: 6/30 & 7/1/15 deadlines 
 […] We hope you have 61 more lead/copper samples collected and sent to the lab 
by 6/30/15, and that they are will be below the AL for lead. As of now with 39 
results, Flint’s 90th percentile is over the AL for lead. (A. Rosenthal, personal 
correspondence, June 25, 2015) 
In the case of LeeAnne Walters, her home was removed from the sample pool because 
she used a home filtration system, which was thought to misrepresent the data because 
the water would, theoretically, be higher quality than that of homes without that system: 
From: Busch, Stephen (DEQ) 
Sent: Friday, February 27, 2015 1:48 PM 
To: Crooks, Jennifer; Deltoral, Miguel 
Subject: RE: HIGH LEAD: FLINT Water testing results  
The City of Flint:  
− Has a 90th percentile lead level of 6.0 ppb based on 100 samples collected 
in its most recent monitoring period of 7/1/2014-12/31/2014, with 2 
samples (23 & 37 ppb) over the AL 
− Has an Optimized Corrosion Control Program  
− Conducts quarterly Water Quality Parameter monitoring at 25 sites and 
has not had any unusual results  
− Has never had a 90th percentile lead AL exceedance 
− 212 Browning, the site in question, is not part of the City’s established 
sample site pool. The residence consists of PVC plumbing materials, and 
has an iron pre-filter at the service connection. (S. Busch, personal 
correspondence, February 27, 2015) 
 MDEQ was never technically out of compliance with the LCR, but they certainly did not 
follow the spirit of the regulation, instead using their interpretation of the rules to claim 
that the water was cleaner and safer than it actually was.  
These water system problems are sustainability problems and they have 
sustainable solutions, such as (1) adding corrosion control or switching back to DWSD 
water; (2) replacing aging pipes; and (3) updating the LCR. All of these solutions have 
been or are in the process of being implemented in Flint. Furthermore, in the rare instance 
when Flint is discussed as a sustainability problem, it is discussed in the context of these 
problems in relative isolation from the expansive problems exposed by the water crisis, 
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such as racism, high water rates, corruption in the criminal justice system, and an utter 
lack of representational democracy (Baum, Bartram, & Hrudey, 2016; Morckel, 2017b, 
2017a; Pieper, Tang, & Edwards, 2017; Wang, Kim, & Whelton, 2019; Zahran et al., 
2017). Sustainability as a field does not have the theory or language to discuss these other 
problems nor does it have the ability to address them. This is due in part to 
sustainability’s aforementioned reliance on positive science and traditional definitions of 
experts in the FWC—MDEQ, city officials, the EPA—experts that claimed time and time 
again that there was no problem with the water in Flint. In contrast, an environmental 
justice lens shows these experts as part of the problem.  
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN FLINT 
Activists have identified a number of environmental justice concerns in Flint, 
including (1) the historical traumas of racism; (2) pre-existing water concerns; (3) the 
criminal in/justice system; and (4) lack of representational democracy (Flint Water 
Advisory Task Force, 2016). The historical traumas of racism are critical to 
understanding why and how the FWC happened. Within Flint, “rigid forms of racial 
segregation (many of them rooted in public policies[such as redlining]) relegated 
thousands of black families to overcrowded, polluted, and dilapidated neighborhoods 
near GM factories, particularly in the city’s North End” (Sadler & Highsmith, 2016, pp. 
145–146). Central to this is the idea of redlining, a racist policy and practice stemming 
from Jim Crow that delineated predominantly white areas as green or “safe” for housing 
lenders to do business in and predominantly Black areas as red or “risky.” Risky areas 
were largely deemed ineligible for housing assistance by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), which meant that families wanting to live in those areas would 
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have to take sub-standard loan agreements not insured by the FHA or rent (Coats, 2014). 
Furthermore, Black families wanting to live in areas that were eligible for FHA assistance 
were barred from doing so under the racist assumption that having a Black family in a 
neighborhood would drive down property value for the other homes (Coats, 2014). This 
served to further segregate American cities and towns, with Black families relegated to 
inner cities while white families fled to the suburbs. In addition, families that were stuck 
renting or had to take sub-par loan agreements were “locked out of the greatest mass-
based opportunity for wealth accumulation in American history” (Coats, 2014). Because 
of this,  
African Americans who desired and were able to afford home ownership found 
themselves consigned to central-city communities where their investments were 
affected by the ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ of the FHA appraisers: cut off from 
sources of new investment[,] their homes and communities deteriorated and lost 
value in comparison to those homes and communities that FHA appraisers 
deemed desirable. (Coats, 2014) 
While the official practice of redlining “ended” in the late 1960s, the legacy of the 
practice persists in neighborhood covenants and racial prejudice in the loan industry. In 
industrial areas like Flint, this segregation only intensified after the economic downturn 
that saw GM cut its workforce. White families took this opportunity to move out of the 
city and into suburbs while Black families had little choice but to stay despite the ancient 
and crumbling infrastructure that would play a part in the FWC:  
Over the past three-quarters of a century, a harsh mix of disinvestment, ‘white 
flight,’ metropolitan political fragmentation, and persistent racial discrimination 
transformed this once economically vibrant although deeply divided city into one 
of the poorest, most racially segregated metropolitan regions in the United States. 
In the end, these forces decimated the local tax base and eroded the city’s 
infrastructure, thus setting the stage for the state’s 2011 takeover of the municipal 
government and the ensuing FWC. (Sadler & Highsmith, 2016, p. 144) 
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The city’s heavy reliance on GM left it one of the least economically diverse regions in 
the nation, which meant that when GM cut jobs, many people were unable to find other 
employment because it simply was not available (Sadler & Highsmith, 2016, p. 147). 
This, combined with the lack of wealth, left the city in a state of economic crisis that 
“manifested itself not only in high rates of urban poverty and racial segregation but also 
in the urban fiscal and infrastructural crises that have collided so powerfully since 2014” 
(Sadler & Highsmith, 2016, p. 150). One factor of this that was highly publicized in Flint 
prior to the FWC is the notoriously high water rates imposed on Flint residents. In August 
of 2014, Wantwaz Davis argued:  
Water is supposed to be a necessity and the water rates are extravagant. If an 
elderly person died here because you turned water off, that could be construed as 
murder. […] The human body is 70 to 75 percent water. We can go without food 
for a long period of time, but never water, which should be affordable. (Fonger, 
2014a) 
These high rates were cited by EM Jerry Ambrose after the switch to the Flint River as a 
reason the City could not return to DWSD:  
The oft-repeated suggestion that the city should return to [the Detroit Water and 
Sewerage Department], even for a short period of time, would, in my judgment, 
have extremely negative financial consequences to the water system, and 
consequently to rate payers. By the most conservative estimates, such a move 
would increase costs by at least $12 million annually [and] the only recourse 
within the city's control would be to increase revenues significantly. And in my 
judgment, that would come from raising rates for water by 30 percent or more. 
(Fonger, 2015b) 
 Because of the lack of revenue in Flint, city officials decided to charge Flint 
residents for the water they used at a rate that would cover the entire infrastructure as 
well as the water lost to leaks due to poor infrastructure. This meant that Flint was paying 
exponentially more than neighboring cities. This largely began in early 2011, when EM 
Jerry Brown increased water and sewer rates by 110 percent over the course of about a 
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year and a half (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). In 2014, Flint was paying “$65 
more per month in water and sewer rates than the next highest municipality in Genesee 
County, and $120 more than the lowest” (Adams, 2014). In August 2014, City 
Councilmember Wantwaz Davis led a protest demanding lower water rates just seven 
days before the first boil water advisory was issued, recommending that residents boil 
their water or purchase bottled water (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). Flint 
residents were charged some of the highest water rates in the country for water they could 
not use; water that was poisoned:  
@PsychoSloth_ 
Literally, the US EPA just got caught covering up themselves because they 
POISONED the water in Flint, MI. Kids drink that water, man.  
4:45 PM – 19 Oct 2015 (PsychoSloth, 2015) 
 
@mccannr1 
Each speaker has said “top priority” is health of Flint residents. Guess that’s why 
they sat on this for a year white kids drank poison water 
7:20 AM – 8 Oct 2015 (Mccannr1, 2015) 
 
@Jonesj1107Jones 
After all that has happened to Flint and its residents the last thing we need is to be 
poisoned by our water. And charged 100$ before a drop 
6:36 AM – 21 Jan 2015 (Jonesj1107Jones, 2015) 
For some Flint residents, these water rates simply were not affordable, so they did 
not pay. The city responded to this by shutting off water services to those with overdue 
bills. Furthermore, these individuals were criminalized by the city because of their 
inability to pay, leading to higher rates of interaction with the criminal justice system, 
such as in the case of Simeon King, who was accused of obstructing a water theft 
investigation:  
Genesee County Circuit Court Judge Geoffrey L. Neithercut dismissed a case 
against Simeon King, 49, who officials claimed obstructed a water theft probe at a 
Flint home. Prosecutors alleged that when Marcus Mahan, a deputized special 
investigator assigned to investigate water theft in Flint, tried to enter King's 
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girlfriend's house to examine the water meter, King would not allow him inside, 
would not provide his identification and allegedly pushed Mahan and another 
uniformed officer out of the home. […] Al Zerka, King's defense attorney, argued 
that King did not have to let Mahan into the home and that he should not have to 
provide identification to police when he had done nothing wrong and was 
minding his own business inside the home when police knocked on the door. […] 
King did not obstruct police officers, because they had no right to be inside the 
home, his attorneys said. (Young, 2014c) 
This was particularly true for people who “illegally” turned the water back on, such as 
City official Warren Southall II, who was arrested after being caught “illegally” turning a 
resident’s water back on:  
A city of Flint employee has been charged and arraigned following his arrest last 
week on accusations that he illegally turned on a resident’s water. […] Warren 
Southall II, 37, has been charged with one count of malicious destruction of utility 
property, according to Flint District Court Records. (Young, 2014a) 
This problem was apparently so prolific that the city had to create a task force to 
deal with what they called “water theft” (Flint Water Advisory Task Force, 2016). This 
taskforce, which in 2014 was investigating over 50 cases related to water theft, was 
headed by retired police officer Marcus Mahan, who said,  
We know that there are numerous individuals out there that think they can steal 
from their neighbors, their city, whoever it may be. That is not the case. We are 
going to prosecute you, and we are going to prosecute you to the fullest. (Young, 
2014b) 
It is important to remember that this criminalization was happening after the initial 
switch, meaning the water was already poisoned.   
Perhaps the most significant environmental justice problem faced during the FWC 
was the lack of representational democracy through the appointment of an EM beginning 
in 2011. The role of the EM was to save the city money whatever the cost, and they had 
the authority to override the mayor and city council in order to accomplish this: 
Pursuant to Public Act 436, the Emergency Manager has broad powers in 
receivership to rectify the financial emergency and to assure the fiscal 
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accountability of the City of Flint and its capacity to provide or cause to be 
provided necessary services essential to the public health, safety and welfare; and 
 
Pursuant to Public Act 436, the Emergency Manager acts in place of local 
officials, specifically the Mayor and City Council, unless the Emergency Manager 
delegates specific authority; and 
 
Pursuant to Public Act 436, the Emergency Manager has broad power to manage 
the local government, and may issue orders to elected and appointed officials 
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Act; and  
 
Pursuant to Public Act 436, the Emergency Manager is issuing this order to rectify 
the Financial Emergency and allocate responsibilities in the event of the 
appointment of a Receivership Transition Advisory Board. […] 
 
(a) The Mayor and City Council shall implement all of the following financial 
best practices within the city and do all of the following:  
 
1) Safeguard the financial stability by seeking out, approving, and implementing 
cost-saving measures recommended by the City Administrator, the Board, or both. 
[…] 
 
4) The City Council shall not interfere with the employees of the City. (STAFF 2 
PAGE 144) 
It was an EM who made the decision to sign on to the KWA and it was likewise an EM 
who decided to use the Flint River in the interim. Many in Flint have called this a 
dictatorship as the EM was responsible only to the Governor of Michigan rather than to 
the people of Flint. Furthermore, while Flint Mayor Dayne Walling has been the subject 
of much well-earned criticism, little attention has been paid to city council members who 
were vocal during the FWC such as Eric Mays, Wantwaz Davis, and Scott Kincaid. 
While it is impossible to know what would have happened had Flint not been under the 
control of an EM, it is significant that the government—particularly the City Council—
chosen by the residents of Flint (or at least parts of it) was so outspoken about water 
justice concerns.  
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It is also significant that this stripping of democratic rights occurred in a majority 
Black area as it reflects the long history of disenfranchisement of Black Americans 
beginning with chattel slavery. This is clear in the 3/5 compromise, which delineated 
Black Americans as less human that whites for the purposes of maintaining white control 
of government as well as felony disenfranchisement rules, which disproportionately 
impact Black Americans who are already disproportionately targeted by the prison 
industrial complex (Alexander, 2012; Stanley & Smith, 2015).  
In this chapter, I retold the story of the FWC through the narrative lens afforded 
by government officials and media outlets during the time of the crisis. I then examined 
the FWC through the lens of IEV and the lens of sustainability, asserting that the 
solutions offered by a sustainability discourse were and are insufficient to address IEV in 
Flint. I asserted this by analyzing the environmental injustice and racism that occurred 
prior to the crisis and persists to this day, factors that are likewise insufficiently addressed 
by environmental justice discourse. In the following chapter, I will analyze the role that 
knowledge production plays in sustainability discourse broadly and the FWC specifically, 
highlighting the significance of narrative structure in environmental crises.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF NARRATIVE AND KNOWLEDGE IN IEV 
In this chapter, I examine the role that knowledge production plays in addressing 
IEV. I begin by returning to the idea of narrative, comparing the FWC to Love Canal in 
their shared reliance on a white mother as the main character. In order to explain this 
reliance, I then analyze the discourse of knowledge production in terms of sustainability 
discourse and the FWC. Patel (2016) contends that “settler colonialism, with its 
architecture of racist capitalism, relies on narratives that blur its purposeful inequitable 
violence” (Patel, 2016, pp. 399–400). The narrative of the FWC is gendered and 
racialized in such a way as to reinforce the hegemonies of white supremacy and 
patriarchy while illustrating that justice always prevails, effectively masking the 
deliberate violence experienced by those impacted. This narrative centers on a lower-
income white mother who “single-handedly” saves her community from environmental 
degradation by partnering with scientists and refusing to back down. This mirrors the 
narrative of Lois Gibbs and her role in Love Canal:  
In 1978, as a twenty-seven-year-old housewife, Lois Gibbs discovered that her 
child was attending an elementary school built on top of a 20,000-ton toxic 
chemical dump in Niagara Falls, New York. Out of desperation, she organized her 
neighbors into the Love Canal Homeowners Association and struggled for 
relocation. […] Dioxin. She was the subject of a CBS prime-time movie and 
received awards including the 1990 Goldman Environmental Prize; an honorary 
Ph.D. from the State University of New York, Cortland College; the 1998 Heinz 
Award; and the Independent Sector's John W. Gardner Leadership Award. (Gibbs, 
2002, p. 97) 
Stories that do not fit this narrative rarely get the same sort of national attention or wide 
recognition, such as in the case of Black Mesa or Standing Rock. A critical element to 
these narratives is a happy ending—Love Canal resulted in the relocation of residents, 
proving that with enough pressure from a white woman with science on her side, 
anything is possible.  
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This narrative structure erases the thousands of Black and non-Black people of 
color (NBPOC) residents who spoke out in Love Canal:  
White women’s maternalistic language emerged loudly during the Love Canal 
crisis. Lois Gibbs’s effective use of the media eclipsed other types of rhetoric 
being used, as well as other groups’ visibility, including not only male residents, 
but also African Americans in the neighborhood. (Blum, 2008, p. 63) 
And in Flint:  
No citizens who complained publicly about the water [in Flint] almost right away 
were cited as heroes, nor were any of the pastors who organized months of 
protests and marches. Neither were any of the local politicians who took the 
people seriously early nor any of the community coalitions, local businesses or 
ex-felons who participated in bottled water drives when Flint was only a local 
story. Most of the original families who promptly conducted home lead testing 
remain anonymous. (Jackson, 2017) 
The City of Flint is nearly three fifths Black, and yet the central figures of the FWC 
remain largely white. Not only is this problematic, but it contributes to this narrative of 
environmental justice problems as requiring white women and scientists in order to be 
“solved.” The FWC is certainly not “solved,” as the causal factors and justifiable distrust 
of the water and the government remain, although switching back to DWSD water does 
make a compelling resolution in terms of this narrative, which furthers my point. This 
narrative simplistically centers the role of experts while devaluing the lived knowledge 
and actions of a community of residents. The facts show that Flint residents voiced 
concerns immediately; thousands tested their water, organized, protested, and tried to 
convey their expert knowledge of the crisis to those with the power to do something 
about it. This does not conform to the narrative expectations that, instead turns residents 
into victims needing to be saved.  
In order to analyze why the community’s efforts were largely ignored, I turn now 
to the idea of knowledge in Flint, and how the hierarchies of different forms of 
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knowledge and knowledge production are assigned values differently within 
sustainability and justice problem identification and problem-solving. Specifically, 
because of the emphasis on global problems and science-based technical solutions in 
mainstream sustainability discourse, certain forms of knowledge production that fit 
within the rigid standards enforced by positivist science in academia are valued above all 
others. In contrast, social justice organizing praxis is largely built around knowledge 
produced by impacted communities regardless of that knowledge’s “expert” credentials.  
KNOWLEDGE PRACTICES 
The production of knowledge is, in terms of Western cultural perception, centered 
in positivist science; it thrives in methodologies and theoretical frameworks and scientific 
processes. This is rooted in colonial exclusion that sought and seeks to assert the 
dominance of Western (white) culture and bodies.  This paints scientific knowledge as 
“conveying an evidence-based type of knowledge, universal and ubiquitous and, 
therefore, more sound and effective” than ways of knowing that do not depend on 
academia or the scientific process (Benessia et al., 2012; Casas-Cortes, Osterweil, & 
Powell, 2008; Gibbs, 2002; Tarlock, 2002). This type of knowledge then becomes 
evidence, which “is increasingly emerging as to what ultimately defines the Modern 
state’s decision-making, regulatory, and judicial processes. As promoted, it seems to be 
the result of well-established neutral and objective scientific processes, when, in practice, 
it is intrinsically context- and value-dependent” (Benessia et al., 2012, p. 78). This 
positivist view of science implies a level of objectivity that we as individuals and society 
are fundamentally incapable of attaining as we are necessarily a part of society. While 
sustainability is largely dependent upon positivist science as a basis for action, many in 
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sustainability also recognize the need for the inclusion of non-scientific voices, such as 
stakeholders.  
This is the process of stakeholder analysis, which “i) defines aspects of social and 
natural phenomenon affected by a decision or action; ii) identifies individuals, groups, 
and organisations who are affected by or can affect those parts of the phenomenon […]; 
and iii) prioritises these individuals and groups for involvement in the decision-making 
process” (Reed et al., 2009, p. 1933). Implicit in the term stakeholder is the idea of 
power; the original meaning of the term stakeholder “is a person who literally held the 
money of the bettors while the game was on” (Sharfstein, 2016, p. 477). While some 
models of stakeholder analysis, particularly those in sustainability, do include power 
differentials between stakeholders, there remains an assumption that those who hold a 
stake in a problem have some level of power to contribute to a solution. This assumption 
becomes even more clear in the practical application of stakeholder participation, in 
which individuals with the least power are also the least likely to be able to participate 
because of temporal or financial constraints. Furthermore, the term stakeholder “carries 
an assumption that all stakes have equivalent intrinsic merit” (Sharfstein, 2016, p. 477). 
Under the neoliberal paradigm model, this leaves corporate, governmental, and non-
governmental bodies to make the decisions; “in a world where everyone is a 
‘stakeholder,’ there is less room for public interest” (Sharfstein, 2016, p. 478). While 
there are some models that endeavor to address the lack of public participation and power 
dynamics, there remains the assumption of power, the assumption of intrinsic value, and 
the assigning of stakeholder identity by experts. Implicit in how experts define 
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stakeholders in a bias towards positivist ways of knowing, which serves as a gatekeeper 
to expert status.  
The purpose of stakeholder analysis is to identify groups and individuals that the 
experts believe should have a place at the table; stakeholders are then invited to 
participate in and contribute to discussion of solutions. It is therefore significant that 
current models of stakeholder identification and engagement are exclusionary to 
individuals and types of knowledge that do not comply with the normative structures and 
ideals of traditional academic spaces. This is evident in the way Downing et al. (2003) 
discuss the differences between expert stakeholders and citizens: “expert stakeholders are 
likely to seek solutions to current problems, whereas general awareness of environmental 
issues is usually the focus for a citizen panel” (Downing et al., 2003, p. 190). This 
implies a lack of education among the citizen group while reaffirming the discursive 
power of the expert stakeholder. This is echoed in the way that Downing et al. (2003) 
portray the role of the sustainability professional, who acts as “an expert for citizens, but 
may be more of a generalist […] for expert stakeholders who have a wealth of specialist 
knowledge” (Downing et al., 2003, p. 190). This stratification of value when it comes to 
ways of knowing is indicative of a positivist approach to sustainability science.   
To combat this stratification, some sustainability scientists have worked to 
develop alternative models of stakeholder engagement and public participation within a 
post-positivist framework. Dedeuwaerdere (2017) outlines four such approaches: (1) 
post-positivist transdisciplinary partnership research; (2) backward-looking interpretative 
research; (3) forward-looking interpretative research; and (4) critical theory approach. 
Post-positivist transdisciplinary partnership research is defined by researchers including 
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practitioners as producers of knowledge; “according to this approach, practitioners have 
scientifically relevant knowledge about implementation and unique know-how that is 
crucial in conducting the social experiments” though, “in many situations […], scientists 
still play the central role” (Dedeurwaerdere, 2018, p. 81). Forward- and backward-
looking interpretative research seeks to deepen contextual understandings through 
considering as many alternative perspectives that are considered valid from certain 
viewpoints and in certain situations” such that all voices are heard and given equal value 
(Dedeurwaerdere, 2018, p. 81). The critical theory approach responds “to inequalities in 
society, by making oppression based on gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, social class or work obvious and helping such oppressed groups to free 
themselves” (Dedeurwaerdere, 2018, p. 81). While critical theory is common in many 
fields of social science, sustainability remains dependent on post-positivist 
transdisciplinary partnership research as well as backward- and forward-looking 
interpretative research, which leaves the role of knowledge producer in the hands of 
sustainability experts.  
Community empowerment literature centers the idea of power as a tool for 
change. In particular, this literature discusses power-over as it contrasts power-with; 
power-over describes “the ways of using power that dominate or control” while power-
with is the cooperative use of power “that doesn’t seek to dominate or control” (Kelly, 
2003, p. 20). Power-over is how we typically think of power; this includes 
organizational/institutional leaders who dictate rules and actions as well as normative 
structures that shape a society (i.e. heteronormativity, white supremacy, male dominance), 
and is the basis for the neoliberal leadership paradigm defined by Howieson et al. (2019) 
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(DataCenter & First Wednesdays Planning Committee, 2009, p. 949; Howieson et al., 
2019). Stakeholder engagement within sustainability is dependent upon power-over, 
situating the expert as the one with the appropriate knowledge and giving them the 
authority to make decisions.  
This is reflective of the banking concept of learning, wherein “knowledge is a gift 
bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they 
consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic 
of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry” 
(Freire, 1970, p. 72). This is rooted in the colonial narrative of meritocracy, wherein 
education (which is inaccessible to many, particularly at the higher level) is portrayed as 
the “arbiter of social mobility” (Patel, 2016, p. 398). This then serves to sort people into 
social positions such as “owner, laborer, [or] manager” and subsequently justify those 
very social structures “through the narratives of societal promise, constant opportunity, 
and self-rationalizing myths of meritocracy” (Patel, 2016, p. 399). This serves to relegate 
knowledge that does not adhere to traditional academic models as inferior and inherently 
less valuable and creates a dichotomy of legitimate and layperson knowledge. In Flint, 
legitimate knowledge came from government officials who used their access to positivist 
scientific knowledge as a form of power to make decisions while layperson knowledge, 
which was produced by those affected by the water crisis, was delegitimized and under-
valued for its lack of positivist scientific backing.  
LEGITIMATE KNOWLEDGE 
 Throughout the first two years of the FWC, city, state, and county officials 
emphasized the role of legitimate knowledge as a way of gate-keeping admissible 
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information. From April 2014 when the initial switch was made to February 2015, 
officials at MDEQ and under the EM dismissed any and all claims of poor water quality 
coming from residents on the basis that the water was testing fine according to their 
standards. When fecal coliforms were found in the water, it was found by city officials 
who then disseminated information about the outbreak. When TTHM levels exceeded the 
federal AL, the city once again disseminated information in accordance with federal law. 
The knowledge of residents who used the water was not considered legitimate knowledge 
for the lack of “expert” credentials and was dismissed in the face of scientific data that 
ostensibly proved the safety of the water. Moreover, this steadfast reliance on City and 
State data persisted even in the face of scientific studies conducted by conventionally-
defined experts like Miguel Del Toral/EPA, Professor Marc Edwards, and Dr. Mona 
Hanna-Attisha. These three experts were not considered producers of legitimate 
knowledge because the knowledge they produced did not conform to City and State 
knowledge—they and their knowledge were considered outliers.   
 When Miguel Del Toral tested LeeAnne Walters’ water to find high lead levels, he 
immediately contacted the MDEQ to find answers. He knew that the City was monitoring 
lead and copper levels in drinking water per federal policy and reached out to MDEQ to 
ask what kind of corrosion control the City was using and question their lead testing 
methods. These required samples to be taken after pre-flushing the pipes, which has been 
known to result in lower lead level results that do not reflect actual lead levels. The 
response he got from Stephen Busch, a district supervisor with the MDEQ, doubled down 
on the City’s methods and implied that Del Toral was not qualified to be asking such 
questions:  
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From: Busch, Stephen (DEQ) 
Sent: Friday, February 27, 2015 1:48 PM 
To: Crooks, Jennifer; Deltoral, Miguel 
Subject: RE: HIGH LEAD: FLINT Water testing results  
The City of Flint:  
− Has a 90th percentile lead level of 6.0 ppb based on 100 samples collected 
in its most recent monitoring period of 7/1/2014-12/31/2014, with 2 
samples (23 & 37 ppb) over the AL […]  
− Has an Optimized Corrosion Control Program  
− Conducts quarterly Water Quality Parameter monitoring at 25 sites and 
has not had any unusual results  
− Has never had a 90th percentile lead AL exceedance 
− Continues to meet all applicable plant tap standards and treatment 
technique requirements at its WTP […] 
212 Browning, the site in question, is not part of the City’s established sample site 
pool. (S. Busch, personal communication, February 27, 2015) 
Busch essentially argued that the City was adhering to federal guidelines, which are often 
assumed expert, and therefore could not and should not be questioned. This creates what 
is effectively a hierarchy of knowledge:  
 
Figure 2. Hierarchy of knowledge in the Flint Water Crisis 
This is highlighted on June 24, 2015, when Del Toral sends his “Interim Report: 
High Lead Levels in Flint, Michigan” to his supervisor, Tom Poy, and LeeAnne Walters. 
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Because Del Toral’s memo was technically a draft, it was largely dismissed by the 
MDEQ and City government:  
From: Busch, Stephen (DEQ) 
Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2015 5:21 PM 
To: Wurfel, Brad (DEQ); Benzie, Richard (DEQ); Shekter Smith, Liane (DEQ) 
Subject: FW: here’s the interim report  
Obviously we are not going to comment on an interim draft report. (S. Busch, 
personal correspondence, July 9, 2015) 
The implication is that despite Del Toral having extensive knowledge of lead in water, his 
memo should not be acted upon because it had not been reviewed by superiors at the 
EPA, effectively relegating it from government knowledge to scientific or even 
practitioner knowledge. The memo became even less credible when LeeAnne Walters 
shared it with Curt Guyette, a reporter with the ACLU:  
On Aug 27, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Wurfel, Brad (DEQ) wrote:  
This person [Del Toral] is the one who had EPA lead specialist come to her home 
and do tests, then released an unvetted draft of his report (That EPA apologized to 
us profusely for) to the resident [Walters], who shared it with the ACLU, who 
promptly used it to continue raising hell with the locals.  
Bottom line is that folks in Flint are upset—because they pay a ton for water and 
many of them don’t trust the water they’re getting—and they’re confused, in no 
small part because various groups have worked hard at keeping them confused 
and upset. We get it. […] But it’s been rough sledding with a steady parade of 
community groups keeping everyone hopped-up and misinformed. (B. Wurfel, 
personal correspondence, August 27, 2015) 
Here the implication becomes that the ACLU used Del Toral’s non-expert memo to 
distort information in order to prompt Flint residents to protest the water. There is 
likewise an implicit bias against the so-called “locals” who, by this logic, cannot produce 
knowledge but instead must be given knowledge and similarly are not qualified to discern 
good knowledge from bad knowledge.  
This bias is mirrored in the reaction by government officials to Edwards’ FWS. In 
an email sent to a reporter with the Flint Journal, Wurfel politely implied that the FWS 
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results should not be trusted because they did not come from a certified lab and did not 
reflect the results reported by the City:  
From: Wurfel, Brad (DEQ) 
Sent: Wednesday, September 08, 2015  
To: Ronald Fonger 
Subject: RE: flint water 
The state DEQ is just as perplexed by Edwards' results as he seems to be by the 
city's test results, which are done according to state and federal sampling 
guidelines and analyzed in certified labs. 
 
When I said we were unsure how the Virginia Tech team got its results, that's not 
the same as being surprised that they got them. There are a conservatively 
estimated 15,000 old homes with lead plumbing in Flint alone, and this group 
specializes in looking for high lead problems. They pull that rabbit out of that hat 
everywhere they go. Nobody should be surprised when the rabbit comes out of the 
hat, even if they can't figure out how it is done. 
 
It's scientifically probable a research team that specializes in looking for lead in 
water could have found it in Flint when the city was on its old water supply. We 
won't know that, because they've only just arrived in town and quickly proven the 
theory they set out to prove. And while the state appreciates academic 
participation in this discussion, offering broad, dire public health advice based on 
some quick testing could be seen as fanning political flames irresponsibly. 
Residents of Flint concerned about the health of their community don't need more 
of that. (B. Wurfel, personal correspondence, September 8, 2015) 
Here again is the assumption that residents do not produce knowledge and likewise 
cannot discern good knowledge from bad knowledge. To clarify Wurfel’s assertions, 
Edwards’ team also used state and federal sampling guidelines, although they interpreted 
them differently. Specifically, whereas the City pre-flushed before sampling, FWS 
allowed water to stagnate for 6 hours before sampling; both methods were consistent with 
state and federal guidelines. While Edwards does specialize in water systems, his 
expertise in high lead levels comes from his time exposing high lead levels in 
Washington D.C., where he spent several years working with citizen scientists to test 
residential lead levels (Hanna-Attisha, 2017). Furthermore, Edwards notified the City of 
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Flint and MDEQ that he and his team would be analyzing water samples for lead shortly 
after they arrived:  
From: Marc Edwards 
Sent: Sunday, August 23, 2015 4:57 PM 
To: Adam Rosenthal, Rachel Ptaszenski 
 
I am a professor who specializes in research on corrosion, opportunistic premise 
plumbing pathogens, lead in water health effects and engineering ethics.  
 
Over the next few months we will be studying Flint water quality issues, in 
conjunction with all parties who are interested in this subject. We will be 
launching our web page to publicly report results of our work. 
 
Just giving you a heads up on this. We also intend to collaborate with all parties, 
in an open manner, to the extent that is possible, as our study progresses. (M. 
Edwards, personal correspondence, August 23, 2015) 
This reflects the hierarchy of knowledge wherein government knowledge is valued more 
than academic knowledge and implies that academic knowledge can be manufactured to 
meet certain ends. The desire for objectivity that is so central to positivism is clear here in 
the way that Wurfel implies that good knowledge cannot come out of knowledge 
production that has an agenda or is somehow subjective.  
 This same argument was used to discredit Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha’s research, 
which she presented on September 24, 2015 in a press release. Dr. Hanna-Attisha 
released her findings immediately upon completion instead of going through the peer 
review process because she believed that the urgency of the water crisis demanded it 
(Hanna-Attisha, 2017). Like Del Toral’s memo, this was widely criticized by government 
actors because of its deviance from institutional standards. Government actors 
immediately tried to discredit Dr. Hanna-Attisha, arguing that she “spliced and diced” her 
data, used improper methods, and did not have access to enough data to make significant 
claims (S. Wurfel, personal correspondence, September 24, 2015). As a practitioner of 
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medicine, Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s knowledge was not valued as it did not track with 
government knowledge per the hierarchy of knowledge. Furthermore, Dr. Hanna-Attisha 
was criticized by government actors for her use of “a very emotional approach” in her 
press conference—specifically, she used a fictional child to illustrate the impacts of lead 
poisoning throughout a person’s life (D. Murray, personal correspondence, September 24, 
2015). The use of emotion, as well as her clear agenda to inform residents of elevated 
lead levels, was used to portray her as less credible because she did not conform to 
institutional standards of objectivity.  
LAYPERSON KNOWLEDGE 
 Before the switch to the Flint River, there was a general understanding in Flint 
and the surrounding area that the river water was not clean, which stems from the river’s 
long history as a site for industrial dumping. This led to skepticism and outrage when the 
City announced that it would be using the Flint River as their only source of water while 
waiting for the Karegnondi Water Authority pipeline to be completed. This general 
knowledge of the river’s poor quality was reflected in social media posts around April 
2014 when the water was initially switched:  
@merqwanda 
So they’re gonna start using the flint river for drinking water……. Nah. 
3:04 PM – 24 Apr 2014 (Merqwanda, 2014) 
 
@LOVEVsLoyalty_ 
Flint water is the Flint river water. 😂 😂y'all nastyyyy 
9:10 AM – 25 May 2014 (LOVEVsLoyalty, 2014) 
 
@Ladyy_A2Real 
Bro.. I'm thirsty af. I want some water but I refuse to drink that Flint River shit 
9:05 PM – 1 Jun 2014 (Ladyy_A2Real, 2014) 
In an interview with the Flint Journal, resident Jackie Demberton said, “I grew up in 
Flint, and I know what that Flint River water is about” (Ketchum III, 2015). This is 
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likewise echoed by Michael Gadola, an employee of the Governor, who wrote in an email 
to his colleagues:  
From: Gadola, Michael (GOV) 
Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 3:42 PM 
To: Brader, Valerie (GOV); Muchmore, Dennis (GOV); Agen, Jarrod (GOV); 
Clement, Elizabeth (GOV) 
Subject: RE: Flint water 
[…] To anyone who grew up in Flint as I did, the notion that I would be getting 
my drinking water from the Flint River is downright scary. Too bad the EM didn't 
ask me what I thought, though I’m sure he heard it from plenty of others. My 
Mom is a City resident. Nice to know she's drinking water with elevated chlorine 
levels and fecal coliform. (M. Gadola, personal correspondence, October 14, 
2014)  
The cultural understanding reflects the Flint River’s long history of pollution stemming 
from the area’s booming auto industry and lack of regulation, which led to the byproducts 
of automobile manufacturing being dumped in the river such that “the Flint River carried 
the toxic effluent of a city that was at one time an industrial mecca and economic 
powerhouse” (Butler et al., 2016, p. 94). While the SDWA and other environmental 
protections of the mid-1990s did substantially improve the quality of the water (though 
not to the level of potability), the general understanding of the river as a source of 
pollution remained in the cultural narrative and knowledge of the community. 
 This community knowledge that Flint river water was “nasty” and undrinkable 
was seemingly borne out after the water source was switched and Flint River water 
started to flow from taps. Residents shared photos of brown water, stories of strange 
smells, and accounts of odd health concerns that seemed to coincide with the water 
switch. In combining these real-time experiences with an existing cultural knowledge of 
the poor quality of the river, a collective understanding of the water crisis began to form. 
This collective seemed to be confirmed by more traditionally valued forms of knowledge 
like boil water advisories and reports of violations that reflected the collective 
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understanding of the water as unsafe. This collective understanding, built on countless 
experiences through countless voices, served as a counternarrative to the City’s repeated 
assurances that the water was perfectly safe. Renn et al. (1992) call this social 
amplification of risk, asserting that this collective understanding comes about through the 
consistent sharing of knowledge about the exposure to risk—in the case of Flint, Twitter 
served as a platform on which to share this knowledge (Renn, Burns, Kasperson, 
Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992, p. 154). It is here that it becomes important to understand 
another collective understanding: that the people in power did not serve the interests of 
the community. 
 This understanding is built on decades of inherited trauma as well as 
contemporary experience. The long history of racism, segregation, voter suppression, and 
medical neglect experienced by Black and NBPOC in the United States (along with 
countless other injustices) has done little to foster trust in the government from those 
impacted communities (Omi & Winant, 2015). This lead to a heightened sense and 
awareness of risk due to the lack of government accountability. These traumas are 
integral to understanding areas like Flint, a city thrust into economic distress by redlining, 
segregation, corporate exploitation, and white flight (Highsmith, 2009). These inherited 
traumas were compounded by the appointment of an Emergency Manager in Flint to 
address the financial “emergency” that the city found itself in. This appointment 
effectively deprived the city of a representative democracy, with all elected officials 
being virtually stripped of their power. Instead, decisions were made with the express 
goal of saving money, echoing the history of the needs of Black and NBPOC being 
valued less than financial interests. This cultural understanding is highlighted by the 
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existence of organizations dedicated to addressing these injustices in Flint, such as the 
Concerned Pastors for Social Action (CPSA), an organization that was integral to 
addressing the FWC on the ground in real time.  
 As early as February 2015, Rev. Alfred Harris of the CPSA demanded that Flint 
be reconnected to the DWSD:  
The people of Flint are hurting and need immediate help. […] What needs to be 
done is an immediate reconnection to the Detroit water system. We stand firm in 
the knowledge that lake water is 100 percent better than river water. […] How 
would you like to pay for something you’re afraid to use? […] The health of the 
people [should] always come out on top. The No. 1 concern is the health of the 
people. (Fonger, 2015a) 
The pastors were, of course, met with disdain from city and state officials who did not 
seem to think that the pastors were qualified to be making demands:  
Subject: FW: Flint Pastors Warn They'll Go To Court To Get City Off Flint River 
Water 
On Apr 8, 2015, at 5:27 PM, "Muchmore, Dennis (GOV) wrote: 
Why not, we haven't anything else to do except spend our time chasing our tail. 
This issue isn't going to go away until we do some serious comms work in the 
city. (D. Muchmore, personal correspondence, April 8, 2015) 
In fact, as the pastors consistently made their demands, those same city and state officials 
expressed their frustration that they and other activists refused to believe government 
assurances that the water was safe:  
From: Muchmore, Dennis (GOV) 
Sent: Wednesday, August 05, 2015 9:04 AM 
To: Hollins, Harvey (GOV) 
Cc: Clayton, Stacie (GOV) 
Subject: RE: '20150804_Meeting with Flint's Clean Water Coalition' 
I didn't think that meeting was as useful as others. If people won't accept the 
factual information, I'm not sure there is much we can do about it. […] 
The three activists in the room just want to be right, they don't want answers. No 
matter what we say they’ll always want something else to be the answer. The 
Pastors and the woman form yesterday who usually sits across from me and who 
always lectures us (that's just a reminder of some of the old time negative racial 
experiences she's had and I get it) are really a strong group of people. Usually 
there is a black woman who comes with them, but I missed her yesterday. I really 
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[sic] her and of course, Overton and Hill are pretty impressive people in their own 
right. (D. Muchmore, personal correspondence, August 5, 2015) 
This feeds into the idea that so-called laypeople are simply not smart enough to 
understand or accept the information being given to them by the government.  
 In response to this, the pastors took matters into their own hands, distributing 
bottled water and filters as often as they could and filing multiple injunctions and 
lawsuits on behalf of the residents of Flint. The giveaways were announced by the Flint 
Journal:  
The Concerned Pastors for Social Action have a giveaway planned next week for 
Flint water customers. The organization plans to giveaway 1,500 water filters to 
Flint residents on Tuesday, Sept. 1 at 10 a.m. at Mt. Carmel Baptist Church, 1610 
Pierson Road in Flint. The water filters will be given away on a first come, first 
serve basis. (Emery, 2015) 
To be clear, the CPSA took these actions prior to any official action on lead in the water 
and before the FWS produced scientific knowledge confirming the presence of lead.  
In this chapter, I revisited the idea of narrative in comparing the narrative of the 
FWC to that of Love Canal. In order to explain this connection, I then analyzed the role 
of knowledge production in sustainability discourse and in the FWC. I began by outlining 
the value of knowledge production in Western positivist scientific tradition—a tradition 
that values experts who hold the objective knowledge needed to address sustainability 
problems. I then analyzed the role of this kind of legitimate knowledge in the FWC, 
examining the discourse of some of those “experts” at the time of the crisis. I then 
analyzed the so-called layperson knowledge that was being produced at the same time 
and developing a collective understanding of the FWC. The idea of knowledge 
production is critical in understanding IEV and how both sustainability and 
environmental justice discourse remains insufficient on their own to address it, 
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particularly since sustainability tends to not only devalue, but outright ignore layperson 
knowledge that is not deemed “valuable.” In the following conclusion, I use this 
knowledge dialectic as grounds to call for the development of a transformative 
methodology that centers knowledge produced by those immediately impacted by 
problems.  
As of my final submission of this thesis on April 19, 
2019, Flint has been without clean water for 1824 
days.  
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CONCLUSION: RETHINKING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
VIOLENCE 
As demonstrated above from multiple perspectives, the FWC is an ongoing 
sustainability problem; but when it is discussed as such, it is done using a narrow 
discourse of expert knowledge that fails to describe and analyze problems that deal with 
long histories of trauma and inequity. The problems that sustainability is trying to tackle 
are unfathomably complex, and it is entirely unrealistic to believe that those problems 
stand any chance of being solved through reform—working within the current system 
using the tools of that system. The addition of justice goes beyond sustainability to 
address the roots of unsustainability when those roots extend to problems that positivist 
science simply cannot address. The normal science model identifies a problem and 
conducts research to find a linearly related solution, working deductively “from theory to 
research objectives > research questions > data collection > and so forth, [which] closes 
down the possibility for collaboration with movements” (Brem-Wilson, 2014, p. 120). 
This idea of collaboration with impacted communities is critical to addressing IEV and 
sustainability; in order to critically examine the role that collaboration can play, I turn to 
contemporary social justice literature, much of which has been developed by social 
justice movements themselves.  
The way that knowledge is valued in positivist science is fundamentally rooted in 
colonial power; knowledge produced by people with more social power and within 
powerful institutions is given precedence over knowledge that is not. In particular, 
“colonial-power-knowledge communicates particular cultural presuppositions that elevate 
Western knowledge as real knowledge while ignoring other knowledge” (Doxtater, 2005, 
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p. 619). This has been widely critiqued in the field of Indigenous knowledge, wherein the 
role of exclusionary knowledge production is rooted in maintaining existing hegemonic 
power structures. The idea of positivism is critical to this understanding in that this idea 
of science as infallible and objective allows Western knowledge to be held up as truth 
while simultaneously identifying it “as the fiduciary of all knowledge with authority to 
authenticate or invalidate other knowledge” (Doxtater, 2005, p. 618).  
Objectivity implies that the researcher is entirely detached from the “subject,” 
allowing them to produce knowledge untainted by opinion or emotion. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that “academic processes of knowledge production are not 
insulated from the interests of the researcher,” nor should it be (Brem-Wilson, 2014, p. 
115). It is not only hard to be objective about instances of IEV like the FWC, it is 
impossible. I am certainly not objective about the FWC—I am biased in that I believe the 
crisis constitutes a genocide against Flint residents. My knowledge about the crisis—
which is not expert—is situated within this bias:  
Our interpretations of reality – if we are good researchers – are not arbitrary, but 
neither are they universal or uncontested. “Owning” our own analyses in this 
sense is the first step away from positioning ourselves as having a uniquely 
authoritative understanding of reality. (Cox & Fominaya, 2009, p. 11) 
The knowledge produced by social movements is likewise not objective, nor does it 
pretend to be. This is part of why it is seen as illegitimate by traditional academic 
processes. Despite this, it is these very subjective forms of knowledge that are critical to 
addressing sustainability and environmental justice problems. Carpenter et al. (2013) 
argue that “experiential reality is the starting point for any feminist or anti-racist inquiry 
and theorization into the constitution of social relations and everyday life,” and I contend 
that this extends to sustainability and environmental justice—both of which can and 
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should be feminist/anti-racist in nature by incorporating social justice praxis at all stages 
(Carpenter, Ritchie, & Mojab, 2013, p. 6). Furthermore, I contend that this is absolutely 
critical to combat the “Eurocentric universalism in the idea that we are all part of the 
same homogeneous struggle and white people at the heart of the Empire can tell people 
of color and people in the (neo)colonies the best way to resist,” an idea central to the 
expert focus in sustainability (Gelderloos, 2007, p. 22).  
Freire (1970) offers an alternative to traditional Western colonial academic 
models of producing knowledge that “consists in acts of cognition, not transferals of 
information” (Freire, 1970, p. 79). In this model, learning and knowing becomes shared 
experiences between the “researcher” and the “subject,” to use derivative sustainability 
language. Knowledge production thus becomes the practice of freedom, denying “that 
man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the 
world exists as a reality apart from people” (Freire, 1970, p. 81). Freire discusses this 
within the dialectic structure of the oppressed and the oppressor, a structure that allows 
for a critical understanding of the underlying factors that lead to unsustainability and 
environmental injustice: 
Who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible significance 
of an oppressive society? Who suffers the effects of oppression more than the 
oppressed? Who can better understand the necessity of liberation? (Freire, 1970, 
p. 45) 
The knowledge produced by the oppressed does not have a place in sustainability 
discourse, in part because that knowledge directly challenges the corporate and 
institutional power that sustainability increasingly finds itself in bed with, such as the 
aforementioned Kochs and Waltons:  
[The oppressed] produce knowledge from below, information about society which 
is inconvenient to and resisted by those above: the wealthy, the mighty and the 
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learned (or, as we might say, states, corporations and disciplines). A crucial aspect 
of movement practice is making known that which others would prefer to keep 
from public view, be that practices of torture and extra-judicial executions, the 
effects of individual pollutants and the costs of global warming, levels of rape and 
sexual abuse, the facts of poverty and exploitation, caste oppression and racism – 
the list is long. On a larger scale, movements highlight new ways of seeing the 
world: in terms of class or patriarchy, of colonisation or neo-liberalism, of 
ecology and human rights. (Cox & Fominaya, 2009, p. 1) 
Chesters (2012) takes this a step further in asserting that it is in the interest of 
sustainability to include these non-academic forms of knowledge for the simple reason 
that “civil society and social movements are frequently at the forefront of knowledge 
generation about potential crises in human/ecological systems and can be conceived as 
critical sensors of systems moving from the edge of chaos towards more profound 
societal and environmental change” (Chesters, 2012, p. 146). Perhaps nowhere is this 
clearer in the case of the FWC, in which the residents of Flint should have acted as this 
critical sensor when they brought their concerns about water quality to the attention of the 
local and state governments.  
The role that these institutional bodies played—and continue to play—in 
producing and disseminating knowledge is significant and not limited to sustainability or 
environmental justice. When Michael Brown was murdered on August 9, 2014, his 
community reacted immediately; there was video of his body lying in the streets posted to 
Twitter within minutes under the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. This hashtag 
and the subsequent movement were created in 2013 by Black Activists Alicia 
Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi in response to the acquittal of George 
Zimmerman for the shooting of Trayvon Martin; a Black 17-year-old in early 
2012. (Brown, 2017, p. 33) 
Since Zimmerman’s acquittal, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement has grown 
exponentially, challenging racism and police/state violence across the country and around 
the world.  
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I bring up Michael Brown’s murder because the videos posted directly 
contradicted the story provided by the police who murdered him. When young Black and 
brown children are murdered by police, the average person turns to the police for the 
story; there is an assumption that the police, a government agency, produce knowledge 
that is essentially infallible. Footage of Michael Brown’s murder was not the first 
challenge to this notion, but it has certainly proven to be one of the most significant. 
There is a growing resistance to the prescribed infallibility of knowledge produced and 
disseminated by the police, which is clear in the growth of the #BlackLivesMatter 
movement and organizations like Cop Watch—a national grassroots movement to film 
the police. Both #BlackLivesMatter and Cop Watch are challenging police knowledge 
and narrative with knowledge of their own. This has been attributed—in part—to the use 
of Twitter by activists as a tool for disseminating knowledge. This allows for new types 
of knowledge to be shared and developed among communities without having to rely on 
traditional knowledge dissemination strategies that tend to rely on the news media.  
The Black Lives Matter movement is a response to the immediate and deadly 
threat of police/state violence against Black and brown bodies that seeks to address 
immediate harms while working towards the transformation of the criminal in/justice 
system in the United States. Many activists cited the FWC as an instance of state violence 
against Black and brown bodies, using #BlackLivesMatter when discussing Flint on 
Twitter. The Black Lives Matter movement was extremely vocal during the FWC and 
remains vocal about the crisis to this day. While it is unrealistic to speculate what kind of 
affect this had, I do believe that the FWC remains in the collective consciousness of 
activists in part because of the use of tactics and rhetoric employed by Black Lives 
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Matter. A critical element of Black Lives Matter is the emphasis on transformation of 
institutions; to explore this, I turn to the idea of Transformative Justice.  
TRANSFORMATIONAL JUSTICE 
Sustainability has gained considerable power over the last two decades through its 
partnership/complicity with corporate, institutional, and political interests. However, in 
doing so, sustainability as a discourse has left behind the radical transformational rhetoric 
it claimed to espouse when it first began to address the issue of climate change. Agyeman 
(2008) asserts that in order to regain this transformational rhetoric, sustainability must 
adopt a vision of environmental justice:  
If sustainability is to become a process with the power to transform, as opposed to 
its current environmental, stewardship or reform focus, justice and equity issues 
need to be incorporated in its very core. Our present ‘green’ or ‘environmental’ 
orientation of sustainability is basically about tweaking our existing policies. 
Transformative sustainability or just sustainability implies a paradigm shift that in 
turn requires that sustainability takes on a redistributive function. To do this, 
justice and equity must move centre stage in sustainability discourses, if we are to 
have any chance of a more sustainable future. (Agyeman, 2008, p. 752) 
While this is certainly a critical first step, I contend that truly transformational change—
the kind of change demanded by the wicked problems posed by sustainability—can only 
be achieved through the inclusion of even more radical theories of justice. Audre Lorde 
(1984) famously said that “survival is not an academic skill” (Lorde, 1984, p. 2). This 
means that in order to survive these wicked problems, we must look outside of academia 
to the wide pools of knowledge developed by those who are immediately impacted. 
Sajnani et al. (2012) contend that in order to do this, we must  
avoid the saviour approach – you are not there to ‘save’ anyone! There is a 
difference between charity and solidarity. A charity lens can imply drawing a line 
between ‘the haves and the have nots’ or/and ‘the knowledgeable and the 
ignorant.' While when working in solidarity with communities, there is no one ‘to 
be saved’; knowledge is shared in a collective sense where we facilitate learning 
with each other. (Sajnani et al., 2012, p. 45) 
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This must be true for the entirety of the process, which extends to how IEV is addressed.  
Kershnar et al. (2007) assert that “the most common response to violence is 
collusion—knowing violence is happening and allowing it to happen” (Kershnar et al., 
2007, p. 6). In order to address IEV, it is imperative that we incorporate methods of 
violence prevention and reduction, which is why I turn to the idea of transformative 
justice. Transformative justice (TJ) emerged as a way to address child sexual assault in a 
way that addresses immediate harm while tackling systemic issues so as to prevent future 
harm. GenerationFIVE (2017) defines TJ as “an approach for how we—as individuals, 
families, communities, and society—can prevent, respond to, and transform the harms 
that we see happening in our world” (GenerationFIVE, 2017, p. 37). A big part of TJ is 
the idea of capacity building, allowing communities to respond to violence internally 
rather than rely on government or private institutions (Kershnar et al., 2007, p. 5). 
Kershnar et al. (2007) describe this as a liberatory approach to violence, which “seeks 
safety and accountability without relying on alienation, punishment, or State or systemic 
violence, including incarceration and policing” (Kershnar et al., 2007, p. 5). This is 
central to the idea of TJ, which emerged as an alternative to reliance on state systems, 
which Kershnar et al. (2007) argue perpetuates violence rather than solving it.  
TJ is revolutionary in that it focuses specifically on changing the conditions that 
allow violence to continue. Furthermore, it does this through a collaborative solidarity 
that relies on and centers the knowledge of those immediately impacted rather than 
“experts.” A primary goal of TJ is safety, which GenerationFIVE (2017) defines not as “a 
state to arrive at, but a dynamic set of questions, choices, and skills that allow each of us 
to exercise agency” (GenerationFIVE, 2017, p. 39). When we talk about problems in 
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sustainability, we talk about addressing them with solutions. The rhetoric of solutions is 
unrealistic in the context of IEV because of the implication of finality or completion; a 
solution fixes a problem, but there is no fixing Flint in this sense. Flint can be 
transformed, which is clear in the progress made by local activist groups and movements, 
but it is naïve to assume any kind of solution can fix the FWC. Likewise, it is naïve and 
arrogant to assume that I, a graduate student from Arizona, have the unique knowledge 
and education to solve the FWC.  
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that sustainability and environmental 
justice, particularly in academia, are ill-equipped to handle the wicked problems posed by 
large-scale threats like climate change. What I have not done is offer a solution or a 
methodology for incorporating IEV. This is a critical next step, and one that must be 
taken by an activist with experience with IEV. In many ways, this thesis was a personal 
exploration to understand what my role is and should be in the fight for 
sustainability/environmental justice, and in searching for those answers I relied heavily 
on the work of activists. Engaging with community protest groups produces a type of 
knowledge unattainable in academia, something I have learned firsthand at actions. It is 
because of this that I contend that the logical next step of my “research” is to take a step 
back from academia. If I am to produce a methodology for incorporating IEV, I must do 
so with my comrades in the streets, and I encourage my peers to do the same to the extent 
that they are able. I recognize that not all research can or should take this path, but I 
believe that the problems posed by IEV are significant and immediate in a way that 
demands that my own personal research must.  
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The following is a non-comprehensive list of organizations doing real-time work 
on the ground to address IEV: 
Table 1. Organizations Addressing IEV  
Organization Location 
Flint Rising  Flint, MI 
Extinction Rebellion International  
Sunrise Movement U.S.  
The Movement for Black Lives U.S./International  
Indigenous Environmental Network  U.S./International  
Honor the Earth U.S./International  
Earth First! International 
UndocuFund  Sonoma County, CA 
Cooperation Jackson  Jackson, MS 
Trans Disaster Relief Fund Huston, TX 
Got Green Seattle, WA 
Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment U.S. 
Notes: (Cooperation Jackson, 2014; CRPE, 2016; Earth First!, 1979; Extinction 
Rebellion, 2019; Flint Rising, 2016; Got Green, 2016; Honor The Earth, 1993; 
Indigenous Environmental Network, 2018; Sunrise., 2019; The Movement for Black 
Lives, 2015; Transgender Foundation of America, 2017; UndocuFund, 2018) 
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